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ABSTRACT: The distinctive features of American intergov-
ernmental relations (IGR) are specified, and the last
half-century of policy trends in the United States are viewed
through the conceptual lens provided by the IGR perspective.
Several distinctive features of IGR set it apart from the more
commonplace term, federalism. These features include a
multiplicity of units, the primacy of public officials’ attitudes
and actions, informal working patterns, the prominence of
administrators, and a policy emphasis. Five phases of IGR
form a matrix for classifying recent United States political
developments. The phases are: (1) conflict, (2) cooperative,
(3) concentrated, (4) creative, and (5) competitive. The chal-
lenges presented by the complexity and interdependencies
of IGR point toward a management emphasis. Intergovern-
mental accomplishments appear to hinge on the successful
management of complexity.
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WILLIAM Anderson, one of theintehectual parents of the in-
tergovernmental relations field, once
claimed that &dquo;intergovernmental re-
lations is, I believe, a term indige-
nous to the United States, of a
relatively recent origin, and still
not widely used or understood.&dquo;’
Since Anderson’s assertion in 1960,
the phrase intergovernmental rela-
tions (IGR) has experienced wider
usage, but whether the term is
clearly or adequately understood
remains questionable. Brief attention
to the definition and features of
IGR is therefore appropriate if not
mandatory.
GAINING FORCE BY UNUSUALNESS:
THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
oF IGR
We need look no further than the
author quoted above for a starting
point in clarifying IGR. Professor
Anderson says that IGR is a term
intended &dquo;to designate an important
body of activities or interactions
occurring between governmental
units of all types and levels within
the [United States] federal sys-
tem.&dquo;2 It is possible to use his gen-
eral definition as a starting point to
elaborate the concept of IGR.
First and foremost, IGR occurs
within the federal system. American
federalism is the context, not the
totality, of IGR. IGR encompasses
more than is usually conveyed by the
concept of federalism, where the
emphasis is chiefly on national-state
relationships with occasional atten-
tion to interstate relationships. IGR
recognizes not only national-state
and interstate relations, but also
national-local, state-local, national-
state-local, and interlocal relations.
In short, IGR includes as proper
objects of study all the permutations
and combinations of relations among
the units of government in the
American system.
’ Anderson also assists us in making
a second important point about IGR.
&dquo;It is human beings clothed with
office who are the real determiners
of what the relations between units
of government will be. Conse-
quently the concept of intergovern-
mental relations necessarily has to
be formulated largely in terms of
human relations and human behav-
ior ...&dquo;3 Strictly speaking, then,
there are no intergovernmental rela-
tions, there are only relations among
officials in different governing units.
Individual interactions among pub-
lic officials is at the core of IGR. In
this sense it could be argued that
federalism deals with the anatomy
of the system, whereas IGR treats
its physiology.
A third notion implicit in IGR is
that relations are not one-time, oc-
casional occurrences, formally rati-
fied in agreements or rigidly fixed
by statutes or court decisions. Rather,
IGR is the continuous, day-to-day
pattern of contacts, knowledge, and
evaluations of government officials.
A major concern is with the informal
as well as with the formal, the prac-
tices as well as the principles,
pursued in both competitive and
cooperative interjurisdictional pat-
terns. This third facet of IGR reads
into the concept those activities-as
well as research studies-that have
previously gone under the title of
cooperative federalism, which the
late E. S. Corwin defined as one in
which governmental units &dquo;are re-
garded as mutually complementary
1. William Anderson, Intergovernmental
Relations in Review (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 3. 3. Ibid., p. 4.
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parts of a single governmental mech-
anism all of whose powers are
intended to realize the current
purposes of government according
to their applicability to the problem
at hand.&dquo;4 These words from a con-
stitutional law scholar provide the
desirable emphasis on the working,
problem-oriented informalities of
IGR and at the same time are a re-
minder of the formal, legal, institu-
tional context within which those
relationships originate and flourish.
It has been shown that IGR recog-
nizes multiple unit relationships,
that it respects the primacy of public
officials acting in an interjurisdic-
tional context, and that it is con-
cerned with informal working rela-
tionships in institutional contexts.
A fourth distinguishing characteris-
tic of IGR is its awareness of the role
played by all public officials. Auto-
matically assumed as integral and
important to IGR are mayors, coun-
cilmen, governors, state legislators,
members of Congress and others.
But in recent years more attention
has been paid to the actions, atti-
tudes and roles of appointed admin-
istrators. The increased focus on
administrators as relevant IGR par-
ticipants is a natural outgrowth
of the increasingly important role
played by public bureaucracies in
government. The concern for the
administrative aspects of IGR also
arises, however, from attention to
informal working relationships and
from the academic leanings of most
of the writers who have staked out
claims to the IGR field. A majority
of these persons have been oriented
toward public administration and
have also held a strong interest in
state and local government.
A fifth and final distinctive feature
of IGR is its policy component.
Federalism has, to a large extent,
translated questions of policy into
questions of law and relied upon the
courts for their resolution. Economic
and political complexities, com-
bined with rapid rates of social and
technological change, have greatly
reduced the capacity of courts-and
legislatures-to deal with continu-
ous pressures for policy change. The
secular shift from regulatory politics
to distributive and redistributive
politics signaled new power re-
lationships and configurations to
which the term federalism could be
applied only with awkward and
ambiguous modifiers, such as direct,
private, functional, economic. From
its origins in the 1930s, IGR was
recognized as anchored in politics
and suffused with policy. It retains
those features in the 1970s.
IGR cut its teeth on the massive
political and policy issues that re-
mained following the Supreme Court
decisions on the social welfare
legislation of the New Deal. It
reached early adolescence in grap-
pling with federal aid to education,
urban development and civil rights.
It is now attempting to claim ma-
turity on issues related to citizen
participation and effective services
delivery systems. Near the policy
core of IGR have been fiscal issues.
These have been dominated by al-
locational issues: Who shall raise
what amounts by what method from
which citizens, and who shall spend
how much for whose benefit with
what results? This &dquo;fiscal fixation&dquo;
has sometimes skewed diagnoses of
and prescriptions for IGR problems,
but the main point stands: IGR is
centrally concerned with policy. As
the Kestnbaum Commission noted in
1955, &dquo;The crucial questions now are
questions of policy: What level ought
4. E. S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual
Federalism, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 36
(February 1950), p. 19.
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to move? Or should both?&dquo;5 These
questions, the commission added,
are ones on which the criteria for
judgment &dquo;are chiefly political, eco-
nomic, and administrative rather
than legal. &dquo;6
The five distinctive features of
IGR are summarized in table 1.
These characteristics combine and
interact to produce new directions,
vectors, and results in the conduct
of public affairs in the United States.
A new term or phrase to de-
scribe these special features there-
fore seems amply justified. The term
IGR alerts one to the multiple,
behavioral, continuous and dynamic
exchanges occurring between vari-
ous officials in the political system.
It may be compared to a different,
novel and visual filter or concept
that can be laid on the American
political landscape. It permits one
to observe, classify and cumulate
knowledge without obscuring other
relevant data which prior political
concepts have provided.
PHASES OF IGR
&dquo;To follow still the changes of
the moon,&dquo; Shakespeare
To say that the American political
system has evolved and changed is
trite. The significant questions in
dealing with change are ones center-
ing on the frequency, mechanisms,
direction, and effects of change. It
is possible, for example, to under-
stand aspects of the solar system by
studying carefully the phases of the
moon. Similarly, a better grasp of the
American political system may
hopefully be gained by identifying
and analyzing five phases of IGR.
In each of the five IGR phases,
three main components are con-
sidered. First, what were the main
problems dominating the public
agenda during each phase? Second,
what were the perceptions held by
the main participants that seemed to
guide or direct their behavior in each
phase? Third, what mechanisms and
techniques were used to implement
intergovernmental actions and ob-
jectives during each period? Addi-
tional elements will help describe
each phase, orient the reader, and
reveal the effects of changing in-
5. Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, A Report to the President for Trans-
mittal to the Congress (Washington, D.C.,
June 1955), p. 33.
6. Ibid., p. 33.
TABLE 1
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
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tergovernmental behavior patterns.
These elements are a one-word
descriptor, a metaphoric or graphic
characterization, and an indication
of the approximate dates in which
each IGR phase peaked or climaxed.
The five phase descriptors em-
ployed here, together with rough
date designations are: (1) conflict
(pre-1937); (2) cooperative (1933-
1953) ; (3) concentrated ( 1945-1960);
(4) creative (1958-1968); and (5)
competitive (1965-?). A condensed
and summary chart of the successive
phases is offered in table 2. Added
to that overview are verbal and
graphic expositions of the phases
with important caveats. The phases
are clearly indicated as successive
ones with some overlapping of dates
among the periods. While the dates
have been selected with deliberate-
ness, they are not sharp and arbitrary
cutting points. Forces and tenden-
cies bringing one or another phase
to its climax were present or had
antecedents in prior periods. Also,
caution is necessary on terminal
dates. None of the phases ends in
any exact or literal sense. Each phase
produces carryover effects beyond
the years designated in table 2. In-
deed, it is probably most accurate
to think of the current state of inter-
governmental affairs as resulting
from overlaps of the cumulative and
successive effects of each IGR
phase.
Conflict (pre-1937)
The chief concern of the conflict
phase of IGR was the effort to iden-
tify and implement &dquo;proper&dquo; spheres
of governmental jurisdiction and
neatly defined boundaries for offi-
cials’ actions. This emphasis op-
erated at the state-local level as well
as between national and state gov-
ernments. Dillon’s rule, as a prin-
ciple for interpreting narrowly the
TABLE 2
PHASES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (IGR)
~ ~~ ~~~ ---
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powers of local governments, was
not only an assertion of state suprem-
acy but also a consequence of the
search for the exact limits of local
power. Guiding this search was an
expectation of exclusive powers.
Public officials’ perceptions reflected
these adversary and antagonistic pat-
terns of interaction.
These conceptions and attitudinal
postures by participants were an-
chored in deeper societal values
of competition, corporate organiza-
tional forms, profit and efficiency.
Residual elements of this phase re-
main today on the urban-metropoli-
tan scene in the so-called market
models of metropolitanism and in
the search for the political jurisdic-
tion to perform most efficiently a
particular function-for example,
should an activity be assigned to a
city or to an areawide body?
The manner in which problems of
jurisdiction were resolved in the
conflict model of IGR was through
statutes and the courts. Growing
social and economic complexity sub-
sequently brought regulatory agen-
cies and commissions into being to
referee jurisdictional boundary dis-
putes. The Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 created the first of the great
regulatory commissions and was a
major breach in the century-old
&dquo;administrative settlement&dquo; between
the national government and the
states .7 It broke the long-standing
presumption against the creation
and growth of a national administra-
tive establishment. Attempts to lo-
cate the scope of federal regulatory
power under the commerce clause
and other authority have persisted
to the point that under a recent court
ruling all electric generating and
transmission companies fall under
the rate-making authority of the Fed-
eral Power Commission.
Other illustrations of the con-
tinued adversary, conflict-oriented
pattern of national-state relations
abound. Environmental and health
concerns recently precipitated a
jurisdictional dispute over the
spheres of national and state power
to regulate the safety levels of a
nuclear generating plant in Minne-
sota. National standards set by the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
specified one level of allowable
millirems of radiation escaping from
the reactor into the atmosphere. The
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
set the permissible level of millirems
at only two percent of that sanc-
tioned by the AEC. The Northern
States Power Company brought suit
in the federal court challenging the
state standards and requesting per-
mission to construct the nuclear
power plant without regard for the
Minnesota regulations. At issue in
the case was the application and in-
tent of federal statutes dealing with
atomic energy. The court ruled in
favor of the exclusive jurisdiction
of the national government and in-
validated the more restrictive state
regulations.8 8
These recent court decisions prob-
ably come as close to reflecting
current economic realities, social
interdependencies, and technologi-
cal necessity as pre-1937 courts and
legislatures thought they were re-
flecting economic, social and tech-
nological separatism. That supposed
separatism-however limited, qual-
ified or restricted in practice-gave
7. Leonard D. White, The States and The
Nation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1953), pp. 9-10.
8. Northern States Power Co. v. State of
Minnesota,447 F. 2nd 1143 (1971); see also,
Science 171 (8 January 1971), p. 45, and Harry
Foreman, ed., Nuclear Power and the Public
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1970).
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credence to the metaphor of &dquo;layer
cake federalism&dquo; as a crude means of
describing national, state and local
disconnectedness.
Cooperation (1933-1953)
Several authors have ably argued
and amply demonstrated that inter-
governmental collaboration in the
United States existed throughout the
19th and 20th centuries.9 That such
collaboration was of major signifi-
cance or the dominant fact of our
political history is less clear. It does
seem possible, however, to point to
one period in which complementary
and supportive relationships were
most prominent and had high politi-
cal significance. That period is the
cooperative phase from 1933-1953.
The prime elements of national con-
cern during those two decades were
the alleviation of widespread eco-
nomic distress and response to inter-
national threats. It seems logical and
natural that internal and external
challenges to national survival would
bring us closer together.
The means by which increased
collaboration occurred were several
and varied. Most pertinent for our
concerns were such approaches as
national policy planning, tax credits,
and categorical grants-in-aid. Most of
the dozen or so grant programs en-
acted during the depression period
were broad formula grants, with a
few being open-ended. Special emer-
gency funding arrangements were
instituted during the depression
years and repeated in selected fed-
erally-impacted areas in wartime. As
one observer noted in 1943:
Cooperative government by federal-
state-local authorities has become a by-
word in the prodigious effort to admin-
ister civilian defense, rationing, and
other war-time programs.... Inter-
governmental administration, while it is
a part of all levels of government, is
turning into something quite distinct
from them all.10
The IGR collaboration that persisted
during these years was present on
such unusual occasions as the 1952
steel seizure confrontation; prior to
his seizure effort, President Truman
polled state governors for their
views.
The prime IGR mechanism, as
well as the major legacy of this co-
operative period, was fiscal. Sub-
stantial and significant fiscal links
were firmly established. These estab-
lished conduits were harbingers of
more to come. They also served as
important illustrations of a new and
differently textured model of inter-
governmental patterns, the well-
publicized &dquo;marble cake&dquo; metaphor.
The marble cake characterization
appears to have been coined by
Professor Joseph McLean of Prince-
ton University in the early 1940s for
the visual or contrast effect with the
layer cake conception. Professor
Morton Grodzins probably had the
greatest impact in popularizing and
elaborating the marble cake concept.
Concentrated (1945 -1960)
The descriptor employed for this
IGR phase stands for the specific,
functional, highly focused nature of
intergovernmental interaction that
evolved and dominated the Truman-
Eisenhower years. From 1946 to
1960, twenty-nine major new grant-
in-aid programs were established, a
9. Morton Grodzins, The American System:
A New View of Government in the United
States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Daniel
J. Elazar, The American Partnership: Inter-
governmental Cooperation in the Nineteenth
Century United States (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962).
10. Arthur W. Bromage, "Federal-State-
Local Relations," American Political Science
Review 37, no. 1 (February 1943), p. 35.
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number that doubled the total num-
ber of programs enacted before and
during the depression and wartime
eras. The expanded use of categor-
ical grant programs was accompanied
by increased attention to service
standards and program measure-
ment.
Guiding this growing functional
emphasis were corps of program pro-
fessionals in each of the specialized
grant fields, such as airport construc-
tion, hospital construction, slum
clearance and urban renewal, urban
planning, waste treatment facilities,
library construction, and so on. The
pervasiveness of professionalism en-
hanced the service standards empha-
sis by covering the domain with a
cloak of objectivity and neutrality.
These fit comfortably into Professor
Herbert Kaufman’s conception ofthe
autonomy accompanying &dquo;neutral
competence&dquo; in public administra-
tion contrasted with the control over
policy by a strong executive leader.ll
The professionalism, specialized
grants and growing insulation also
coincided neatly in time, as well as
thematically, with Professor Fred-
erick Mosher’s view that the 1950s
confirmed the triumph of the &dquo;pro-
fessional state&dquo; in the public ser-
vice. 12
What aims or ends guided and
provided the rationale for this surge
of activity? Two appear to be most
prominent. One was a capital works,
public construction push. Between
1946 and 1960, state and local
capital outlays increased twelvefold
while current operating expenses
rose by a multiple of four. Federal
grants for highways, hospitals, sew-
age plants, and airports underwrote
much of the state-local effort to meet
deferred wartime needs and respond
to changing technology and popula-
tion configurations, especially its
suburbanization.
A second motive force propelling
intergovernmental action in this pe-
riod was the political realization
that government generally, and IGR
especially, was capable of respond-
ing to particularistic middle class
needs. The New Deal may have had
its most telling political effect in
making the American middle class
acutely aware of the positive and
program-specific capabilities of gov-
ernmental action. Effective political
action based on this awareness came
after World War II and was rein-
forced by several conditions.
One condition already mentioned
was suburbanization. It constituted
the urban frontier and reinforced the
myth of Jeffersonian ward repub-
lics. Another was the predisposition
for using intergovernmental mecha-
nisms because they also meshed
with the historical political tradition
of localism. In addition, IGR tech-
niques fitted middle class values of
professionalism, objectivity and neu-
trality. It appeared that objective
program needs rather than politics
were being served. Like reform at
the turn of the century, IGR ap-
peared to take a program out of
politics.
Those political values coincided
with an important structural change
at the national level: the legislative
reorganization of Congress in 1946.
The most significant result of this
event for IGR was the creation
and stabilization of standing commit-
tees with an explicit program em-
phasis. These congressional com-
mittee patterns soon became the
11. Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts
in the Doctrines of Public Administration,"
American Political Science Review 50, no. 4
(December 1956), pp. 1057-1073.
12. Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the
Public Service (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968), esp. ch. 4, "The Professional
State."
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leverage points and channels through
which influence on program-specific
grants flowed. Furthermore, the
committees developed their own
cadre of professional staff members
with functional and programmatic
inclinations.
The flow of influence combined
with the concentrated or focused
flow of funds in the 1946-1960 pe-
riod prompts one to employ a hy-
draulic metaphor in depicting this
phase of IGR. The national govern-
ment had become an established
reservoir of fiscal resources to which
a rapidly increasing number of water
taps were being connected. The
functional flows of funds could be
facilitated by those knowledgeable
at turning on the numerous spigots,
that is, the program professionals.
Cooperation was prominent during
this period, but it occurred in more
concentrated and selectively chan-
neled ways.
A crude effort to express the water
tap phase of IGR is made in figure 1.
The intergovernmental flow of funds
for 1950 is shown by the lines con-
necting the national-state and state-
FIGURE 1
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES BY TYPE AND BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FLOW OF FUNDS, FISCAL YEAR 1950
(in billions of dollars)
. Excludes interest on the national debt ($ 4.4 billion)
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local spending sectors. This phase
of IGR confirmed the interconnected
and interdependent nature of na-
tional-state-local relations.
Creative (I 958 -1968)
The foundations for the creative
phase of IGR were formed and filled
in the cooperative and concentrated
periods. The dates delimiting this
phase are again somewhat arbitrary,
but they mark a decade of moves
toward decisiveness rather than drift
in American politics and public pol-
icy. The election of a heavily Demo-
cratic Congress in 1958 and the 1964
presidential results were the politi-
cal pegs to which this phase of IGR
was attached. An added input that
contributed to direction and cohe-
siveness, if not decisiveness, was
the report of the Eisenhower-ap-
pointed President’s Commission on
National Goals. The commission,
appointed partially in response to
the Russian challenge of Sputnik,
was created in 1959 and reported in
1961. 13
The term Creative Federalism
is applied to this decade because of
presidential usage and because of
the novel and numerous initiatives
in IGR during the period. Three
mechanisms are prominent: (1) pro-
gram planning, (2) project grants,
and (3) popular participation. The
sheer number of grant programs
alone is sufficient to set this decade
apart from the preceding periods. In
1961 the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
identified approximately 40 major
grant programs in existence that had
been enacted prior to 1958. By 1969
there were an estimated 160 major
programs, 500 specific legislative au-
thorizations, and 1,315 different fed-
eral assistance activities, for which
money figures, application dead-
lines, agency contacts, and use
restrictions could be identified. Fed-
eral grants jumped in dollar magni-
tude from $4.9 billion in 1958 to
$23.9 billion in 1970. At the state-
local level, state aid to local govern-
ments rose from $8.0 billion to $28.9
billion over the 1958-1970 span.
Numbers and dollars alone are in-
sufficient to distinguish the creative
phase. Planning requirements, for
example, were attached to 61 of the
new grant programs enacted be-
tween 1961 and 1966. The tremen-
dous growth in project grants as
contrasted with formula grants in-
creased the diversity of activities
supported by federal funds and in-
creased further the autonomy and
discretion of program professionals.
Project grant authorizations grew
from 107 to 280 between 1962 and
1967, while formula grants rose from
53 to 99 in the same period. Finally,
the public participation require-
ments tied to some grants increased
the complexity, the calculations, and
occasionally the chagrin of officials
charged with grant allocation choices.
To what ends or aims were these
federal initiatives directed? What
were the chief problems addressed
by this activism? At the risk of great
oversimplification, two major policy
themes are identified: (1) an ur-
ban-metropolitan emphasis and (2)
attention to disadvantaged persons
in the society through the anti-
poverty programs and aid to educa-
tion funds. The latter problem needs
little documentation. Only one sup-
porting item is mentioned for the for-
mer. Between 1961 and 1969 the
percentage of all federal aid that
went to urban areas increased from
13. Report of the President’s Commission
on National Goals, Goals for Americans
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spec-
trum Series and the American Assembly of
Columbia University, 1960).
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55 percent to 70 percent, as total dol-
lar amount so allocated went from
$3.9 billion to $14.0 billion. 14
Supporting the urban and disad-
vantaged emphases of this phase
were selective but significant views
held by important actors. President
Johnson’s speech first mentioning
Creative Federalism also contained
a phrase of larger and more popular
political importance, that is, &dquo;The
Great Society.&dquo; As one observer has
noted: &dquo;The Great Society was, by
definition, one society; the phrase
was singular, not plural.&dquo;15 How
much this consensus politics push
owed to the popularity of national
goals efforts in the late 1950s and
early 1960s is unknown. The unitary
emphasis was evident, however. The
president’s preference on the need
for centralized objective-setting
made his 1965 moves toward plan-
ning-programming-budgeting a nat-
ural offshoot of views which held
that our governmental system was a
single system. Indeed, the basis for
such revisionary thinking had been
spelled out in a 1961 speech by
Senator Joseph Clark entitled &dquo;To-
ward National Federalism
Accompanying these national and
unitary sets of participants’ perspec-
tives was a subsidiary theme. It grew
out of the expansion and prolifera-
tion of federal grants. This was
the grantsmanship perspective that
formed around the poverty and
project grant programs. Playing the
federal grant game became a well-
known but time-consuming activity
for mayors, managers, governors,
universities, and, of course, for the
program professionals.
This creative phase of IGR con-
tains a paradox. Federal grants ex-
panded massively in number, scope,
and dollar magnitudes. The diversity
that accentuated grantsmanship ten-
dencies, however, moved from po-
litical and policy assumptions that
were common-if not unitary-in
their conception about the aims of
society. The paradox is one of pro-
liferation, participation, and plural-
ism amid convergence, consent, and
concord. The prominence of the
latter set suggests that &dquo;fused&dquo; is an
appropriate metaphor by which this
IGR phase can be characterized. An
effort to show visually the coalesced
character of IGR at the end of the
creative period is provided in figure
2. The ties between national-state
and state-local sectors are broad and
weld the segments into a closely
linked system. The visual contrast
between figures 1 and 2 helps con-
firm the shift from a focused to a
fused model of the IGR system.
The contrasting component pres-
ent in this creative phase has not yet
been noted. Figure 2 conveys the
impression of intense interconnect-
edness and interdependence. What
it does not convey is the diversity,
proliferation, and fragmentation of
the national-state fiscal links. There
may be a superficial appearance of
fusion, but the scores of specific and
discrete categorical grants require
additional adjectives to describe this
period, such as the fused-foliated or
proliferated phase.
Other, more crude metaphors that
could be used are flowering federal-
ism and spaghetti federalism. Both
terms attempt to capture the elab-
orate, complex, and intricate features
of IGR that developed in this phase.
14. Special Analyses, Budget of the United
States, Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington, D.C.,
1970), pp. 228-229.
15. James L. Sundquist, Making Feder-
alism Work: A Study of Program Coordina-
tion at the Community Level (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 12.
16. George Washington University, The
Federal Government and the Cities: A Sym-
posium (Washington, D.C.: George Washing-





The proliferation of grants, the
clash between professionals and par-
ticipation-minded clients, the gap
between program promises and
proven performance, plus the in-
tractability of domestic urban and
international problems, formed a
malaise in which IGR entered a new
phase.
A different statement of central
problems emerged when the admin-
istrative consequences of prior leg-
islative whirlwinds became the cen-
ter of attention. Issues associated
with bureaucratic behavior and com-
petence came to the forefront. One
talisman earnestly sought was co-
ordination. Others in close associa-
tion were program accomplishment,
effective service delivery systems
and citizen access. Attention shifted
to administrative performance and to
organizational structures and rela-
tionships that either hindered or
helped the effective delivery of pub-
lic goods and services.
A sharply different tack was taken
regarding appropriate IGR mecha-
nisms. Pressure grew to alter and
even reverse previous grant trends.
Grant consolidation and revenue
sharing were mentioned, popular-
ized, and ultimately proposed by a
Republican president on the basis
of both program effectiveness and
strengthening state and local gov-
ernments. Some progress was made
in the grant consolidation sphere,
but as of 1973 the ACIR reported 69
formula grants and 312 project grants
in existence. On the federal admin-
istrative scene, moves were made
toward regionalization and reorgani-
zation. With the strong support of
mayors, governors and county of-
ficials, general revenue sharing
slipped through a divided Congress.
A flood of other developments in
the late 1960s and early 1970s un-
derscored the competition present in
the system and also signaled efforts
to reduce it. Perhaps the more visible
actions and initiatives came at the
national level, but in numerical
terms and potential significance,
important policy shifts occurred at
the state and local levels. It is im-
possible to compress the numerous
trends that were competition-induc-
ing and to acknowledge some that
eased competitive tendencies. Only
three policy patterns will be men-
tioned as illustrations of tension-
promoting developments: (1) eco-
nomic opportunity programs and
their chief implementation mecha-
nisms-community action agencies;
(2) &dquo;white flight&dquo; and the polarize-
tion of central city-suburban rela-
tionships, especially along racial
lines; and (3) elimination or funding
reductions in several grant programs
by the Nixon administration in 1973
-some of which were achieved by
the impounding of funds.
Countervailing tendencies in the
direction of reduced tensions and in-
creased cooperation appeared during
this competition-dominated phase.
At the local level, prompted and
supported by national action, coun-
cils of governments sprang into ex-
istence in large numbers. One major
aim was to foster metropolitan
and regional coordination, espe-
cially through the A-95 grant review
process. At the state level, herculean
tax efforts were made to: (1) expand
state services, (2) greatly increase
state aid to local governments,
and (3) meet the enlarged state-
level funding requirements to match
the vastly expanded federal grant
monies .17 Tension-reducing aims can
17. For example, state funds to match
federal aid increased from $5.1 billion in
1964 to an estimated $18.4 billion in 1972;
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also be attributed to such national-
level actions as new departures with
interstate compacts, the Partnership
for Health Act (P.L.89-749), the
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
of 1968 (P.L.90-577) and the Inter-
governmental Personnel Act of 1970
(P.L.91-648).
The developments noted above
reflected contrasting sets of perspec-
tives that old as well as new partici-
pants brought to IGR. A statement
by Senator Edmund Muskie-Dem-
ocrat, Maine-in 1966 will serve as
one example: &dquo;The picture, then, is
one of too much tension and conflict
rather than coordination and co-
operation all along the line of ad-
ministration-from top Federal pol-
icymakers and administrators to the
state and local professional adminis-
trators and elected officials Sim-
ilar views about the unwarranted
degree of disagreement, tension, and
rivalry among and between officials
prompt the use of &dquo;competitive&dquo; for
this phase of IGR.
The competition, however, is dif-
ferent in degree, emphasis, and
configuration from the interlevel
conflict of the older, layer cake
phase. It is more modulated, and it
acknowledges the lessons learned
from the intervening periods of co-
operation, concentration and creativ-
ity. For example, the current com-
petitive phase appears reasonably
realistic about the interdependencies
within the system and the inability
to turn the clock back in IGR. The
three statutory enactments cited
above bear witness to reasoned and
reality-oriented approaches to IGR.
The nature of the competition in
the present IGR phase is indicated
in part by Senator Muskie’s remarks.
He mentions professional program
administrators and state-local elected
officials. It is the tension be-
tween the policy generalist, whether
elected or appointed, and the pro-
gram-professional-specialists that cur-
rently produces great static and fric-
tion in IGR. This cleavage is
another reason for describing this
phase of IGR as competitive. A
visual representation of the fractures
and rivalry characterizing this phase
is offered in figure 3. The metaphor
of the picket fence, referred to in
former Governor Sanford’s book,
Storyn Over the States,19 was the
original stimulus for this formula-
tion. The seven public interest
groups, often called the Big Seven,
have parted ways from the functional
specialists. Their common interest
in revenue sharing, grant consolida-
tion and similar proposals represents
a reassertion of the executive leader-
ship doctrine and a challenge to the
program professionals’ doctrine of
neutral competence.
A second type of competition can
also be discerned from figure 3: the
competition between the several
functional program areas. Each ver-
tical picket represents an alliance
among like-minded program spe-
cialists or professionals, regardless of
the level of government in which
they serve. As early as the mid-1950s
these interlevel linkages of loyalties
were identified and criticized as
&dquo;vertical functional autocracies. &dquo;20
see, Deil S. Wright and David E. Stephenson,
"The States as Middlemen: Five Fiscal
Dilemmas," State Government 47, no. 2
(Spring 1974), pp. 101-107.
18. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, 112,
p. 6834.
19. Terry Sanford, Storm Over the States
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 80.
20. Advisory Committee on Local Govern-
ment, An Advisory Committee Report on
Local Government (submitted to the Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Washington, D.C., June 1955), p. 7.
15
16
Other epithets used against these
patterns are: balkanized bureau-
cracies, feudal federalisms and au-
tonomous autocracies. These terms
emphasize not only the degree of
autonomy that the program spe-
cialists have from policy control by
political generalists, but also the
separateness and independence that
one program area has from another.
This lack of horizontal linkage
prompts interprogram, interprofes-
sional and interagency competition.
The cross-program competition com-
bined with the generalist-specialist
split helps confirm the contention
that the competition depicted by the
picket fence model best describes
the current and most recent phase
of IGR.
Both competitive patterns were
captured in the words of local offi-
cials as quoted by James Sundquist.
Speaking in the late 1960s, the di-
rector of a local model cities program
contended that &dquo;Our city is a battle-
ground among federal Cabinet agen-
cies.&dquo;21 Similar sentiments came
from mayors and city managers
whose limited control and coordina-
tion powers over federal programs
caused them to feel like spectators
of the governmental process in their
own cities. If, in fact, this competi-
tive model is applicable to IGR
today, then a recognition of these
tensions and cleavages would seem
to be the first-order task of those
seeking changes and improvements
in IGR.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
IGR has become a distinctive di-
mension of activities in the American
political system. It refers to a sig-
nificant domain of political, policy
and administrative actions by public
officials. An acknowledged emphasis
was made in this discussion on the
meaning, features and trends in IGR
(as a term or phrase). Concept ex-
plication and clarification have their
uses; but they also have limits.
There is much more to be said about
the realities, practices and problems
of IGR. Subsequent articles are ap-
propriately addressed to these types
of concerns.
One concluding comment on this
exposition is offered in anticipation
of the analyses that follow. This is
an era when the management of IGR
is a matter of major moment. James
Sundquist observes that &dquo;The federal
system is too important to be left to
chance. &dquo;22 His book can be seen as
an effort to critique and reconstruct
the organizational philosophy under-
girding effective intergovernmental
action. Sundquist’s treatment and
the mood of this essay move toward
a similar conclusion: intergovern-
mental achievements hinge on cop-
ing successfully with complexity.
Complexity is an inherent and per-
sistent characteristic of the several
features of IGR. Accomplishments in
the intergovernmental arena there-
fore depend on the successful
management of complexity.
21. Sundquist, Making Federalism Work,
p. 27. 22. Ibid., p. 31.
